After nearly 20 years of incarceration for a crime he did not commit, Juan Rivera walked out of prison a free man on Friday, January 6, 2012. His release came after the Illinois Second Appellate Court threw out his murder conviction. This was the third time the Appellate Court had reversed the wrongful conviction of Rivera for the murder of 11-year-old Holly Staker.
The Appellate Court’s harshly worded,
24-page ruling states that the theories that prosecutors offered at trial were “highly improbable” and “distort to an absurd degree” the testimony from witnesses.
In at least two other cases, one of them a death penalty case and all of them documented by the Tribune over the years, Lake County prosecutors stretched credulity in seeking to blunt DNA evidence.
In the Rivera case and in the case in which they sought the death penalty, they insisted that a disputed confession was more reliable. That suggested to many attorneys and other close observers of the Lake County system that the prosecutors there had failed to learn about the frailties of confessions, highlighted in cases across the country by DNA evidence that proved those confessions false.
"This is just one of the very highly problematic cases that have been prosecuted in defiance of common sense and overwhelming physical evidence, especially DNA evidence," Rob Warden, executive director of Northwestern University's Center on Wrongful Convictions, which represents Rivera, said after the ruling was issued. "The people of Lake County need to wake up to what their prosecutors are doing."
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the appellate court said Rivera “has suffered the nightmare of wrongful incarceration.”
The nightmare began on August 17, 1992, when police responded to a call in Waukegan, Illinois after a woman living there, Dawn Engelbrecht, reported that her babysitter, Holly Staker, was missing. The back door to Engelbrecht’s apartment had been kicked in. The police found the victim’s partially clothed body on the floor of the children’s bedroom. She had been raped and then stabbed 27 times. She was pronounced dead at the scene.
Juan Rivera was brought in for questioning. He told interrogators that he had never been in the apartment where the murder occurred and that he had not committed the crime. However, in subsequent interrogations, Rivera gave inconsistent statements regarding his whereabouts at the time of the murder.
After four days of police interrogation, in which, according to the Appellate Court, detectives psychologically manipulated the fragile Rivera, who was banging his head against a wall and pulling his hair out at one point, Rivera signed two confessions, saying Holly had invited him into the home where she was baby-sitting and had sex with him. When she mocked his performance, according to the statements, he stabbed her to death.
Rivera’s lawyers later argued that the confessions used words that were beyond the vocabulary of Rivera, who had an IQ of 79 and a 3rd-grade reading level. Incredibly, police did not retain the notes they used when writing the confessions signed by Rivera, and they did not tape Rivera’s statements.
Rivera had recently been arrested for allegedly stealing a car stereo, and the electronic monitoring device a court had ordered Rivera to wear while awaiting trial showed Rivera was home at the time of the murder.
The state claimed that the device must not have been functioning.
As for the lack of an eyewitness who could place Rivera at the crime scene – Illinois authorities took care of that problem too.
Dawn Engelbrecht testified that on August 17, 1992, while the police were at her home collecting evidence, a crowd gathered in the street and someone, who she later identified as Rivera, approached her. However, in Rivera’s third trial, Engelbrecht testified that she did so only because the police had shown her photos of Rivera and told her that he had admitted being the person who approached her in the street.
The prosecutors’ star witness was Frank McDonald, a jail house snitch. According to McDonald, Rivera had asked him to read some of the trial discovery materials to him. Upon reading the materials, McDonald accused Rivera of killing the victim. McDonald testified that Rivera admitted that he had. Prior to testifying in court, McDonald admitted that he had attempted to sell Rivera’s discovery materials to a reporter for the Chicago Tribune.
On November 19, 1993, a jury convicted Rivera for the murder of 11-year-old Holly Staker. Rivera was convicted largely on the basis of his disputed confession and the testimony from McDonald. That conviction was set aside in 1996 by the Illinois Second Appellate Court, which ruled that the trial judge, Christopher Starck, had made a series of errors as he presided over the case.
At Rivera’s second trial, in 1998, prosecutors brought in a second jail-house snitch, David Crespo, a drug addict who testified that after he and Rivera had attended a Spanish Bible study class together; Rivera admitted that he had killed the victim. Crespo’s decision to testify against Rivera came after a falling out with Rivera’s family. Upon Crespo’s release from jail, Rivera’s family had taken him in. Crespo came forward with his claim about Rivera only after Rivera’s family made him leave their home for using drugs while living there.
In 2004, the trial court granted Rivera’s motion for DNA testing of material from vaginal swabs taken at the victim’s autopsy. In 2005, a forensic testing company tested sperm from a swab stick, and the vial in which it had been held, and made a finding that Rivera was “excluded as the source of the DNA obtained from the swab and vial.” Nevertheless, prosecutors pressed on.
In Rivera’s third trial, prosecutors relied heavily on the hearsay testimony of the jail-house snitches who had previously testified for the state. Prosecutors presented the 1993 trial testimony of Frank McDonald, now deceased; and read the 1998 trial testimony of David Crespo to the jury.
The defense poked numerous holes in the state’s so-called evidence, leading some
Chicago journalists to predict that Rivera would finally be set free. Eric Zorn, in his
Chicago Tribune column,
said the state's theory of the crime had become increasingly hard to believe as time had gone on.
The defense questioned why authorities did not retain the notes they used when writing the confessions signed by Rivera, and why the statements were not taped.
Dawn Engelbrecht testified that she had identified Rivera as the man who had approached her on August 17, 1992, only after police showed her a picture of Rivera and told her that Rivera had admitted to approaching her. She later
told the Chicago Tribune that she had "caved" against pressure from detectives.
"I was wrong, and I knew I was wrong," she said in a recent interview. "I just went along with it. And I shouldn't have."
Alan Keel, of Forensic Science Associates, testified that the DNA evidence was from an “Unidentified Male #1.” Keel determined conclusively that Rivera was not the source of the sperm. Keel further testified that the “high ratio of sperm DNA to epithelial cell DNA demonstrate that the semen had not been in the vagina long” and it “had not had time to dissipate,” and thus, the sperm had been “recently deposited in the vagina.”
William Frank, the senior DNA analyst for the Illinois State Police crime laboratory, testified that he agreed with Keel’s conclusion that the DNA profile was a single-source male DNA profile and that “there was no indication that the sample was mixed with DNA from more than one male.” At the State’s request, the police crime lab conducted independent testing of the evidence and found that Rivera was absolutely excluded.
Kenneth Moses, a crime scene investigator and director of an independent forensics laboratory in San Francisco, testified that investigators had recovered approximately 70 images of finger and palm prints. He said unidentified prints were referred to as “open” prints. Moses concluded that all of the open prints excluded defendant; that is, the prints were not Rivera’s.
Despite the lack of any physical evidence connecting Rivera to the crime, and the DNA evidence exculpating him, Rivera was convicted of Holly’s murder for a third time on May 8, 2009.
The appellate court determined that with respect to the physical evidence linking defendant to the offense. “There was none.”
With respect to the DNA evidence linking defendant to the offense, the appellate court found “there was none.”
The court found that “In light of all the evidence, the State’s theories are highly improbable.”
“After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” the Appellate Court concluded, “we hold that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must reverse the conviction of Juan A. Rivera, Jr.”
Illinois prosecutors, with absolutely no physical evidence connecting Rivera to the rape and murder of Holly Staker, used bogus hearsay testimony and a highly-implausible coerced confession to fabricate a case against Rivera. Their actions likely ensured that the person who really did kill Holly will never be brought to justice.
¶ 29 First, we discuss the physical evidence linking defendant to the offense. There was none. The State and defendant presented a stipulation that, although there were many fingerprints lifted from the Engelbrecht residence that were suitable for comparison, no fingerprints were matched to defendant. Further, Moses concluded that the open prints, those which had not been identified, excluded defendant. The blood found in the bedroom was not matched to defendant. The physical evidence with respect to the damaged back door was not matched to defendant. The bloody streaks near the banister on the front staircase were not matched to defendant. The knife, which was broken into two pieces and found in a neighbor’s yard, was not matched to defendant. The blue mop handle and towel were not matched to defendant.
¶ 30 With respect to the DNA evidence linking defendant to the offense, there was none. Keel, who conducted DNA testing on evidence from the rape kit taken at the victim’s autopsy, i.e., one of two vaginal swabs and the vial in which the swab had been stored, determined that the epithelial cells all matched the victim and that the sperm was from a single male profile, which he labeled as “Unidentified Male #1.” Keel determined conclusively that defendant was not the source of the sperm. Keel also testified that the high ratio of sperm cells to epithelial cells indicated that the sperm was deposited shortly before the victim died.
¶ 34 The State’s theories distort to an absurd degree the real and undisputed testimony that the sperm was deposited shortly before the victim died. Simply put, the State’s rationalizations of how the DNA from “Unidentified Male #1” came to be found in the victim’s body (“as unlikely as it seems, this young [11-year-old] girl apparently had sex with someone else”) and why none of defendant’s DNA appeared in or around the victim or anywhere at the crime scene cannot save a conviction obtained on a theory of a violent sexual assault and murder. The State did not present any evidence that the victim was in a relationship with anyone. The undisputed evidence from the trial reflects that there was only one male whose bodily fluids were found on the victim; this male was not defendant but rather “Unidentified Male #1.” The most reasonable explanation of the DNA evidence is not defendant but rather “Unidentified Male #1.” The most reasonable explanation of who sexually penetrated the victim, based on the DNA evidence, is not defendant but rather “Unidentified Male #1.” The most reasonable explanation, therefore, of who murdered the victim is not defendant but rather someone who, unfortunately, has not yet been identified.”
¶ 38 …because defense counsel exposed McDonald’s motivation to profit financially by involving himself in the case, his testimony should be subject to suspicion, viewed with distrust, scrutinized carefully, and acted upon with caution… Crespo was exposed as a drug user, who came forward only after defendant’s family turned their backs on him for using drugs while staying at their house. Our supreme court has plainly stated that “the testimony of a narcotics addict is subject to suspicion due to the fact that habitual users of narcotics become notorious liars.” (
People v. Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 396, 399 (1962) (citing
People v. Boyd, 17 Ill. 2d 321, 326 (1959)).
¶ 43 On our review of the record, the State’s independent evidence does not inspire belief in defendant’s candid acknowledgment of guilt. The State acknowledges that 15 of the 54 “facts” contained in defendant’s statements had all been published in newspapers, and it acknowledges that defendant’s father had learned about the crime in the newspapers and on television and discussed it with defendant. Although the State argues that no evidence reflected that defendant had read the newspapers or which specific details of the crime defendant’s father had discussed with defendant, this does not establish defendant’s independent knowledge of the facts beyond a reasonable doubt… It was the State’s burden to establish that defendant had not read the newspapers or was not otherwise privy to these details. It was the State’s burden to establish that defendant’s father had not discussed with defendant the media coverage of the murder.
¶ 44 Contrary to the State’s argument that there was no evidence that the police fed information to defendant, the record reflects that officers used leading questions during their interrogation of defendant. Both Maley and Tessmann interrogated defendant using facts of the case. Maley testified that, during the interrogation, he questioned defendant as to whether the victim was really wearing a nightgown. Tessmann admitted using leading questions regarding the victim’s attire, asking “She had a multi-colored shirt on, right?” Maley’s testimony reflected that Tessmann asked defendant questions “about facts in the previous statement that he believed were untrue.” Following this session of interrogation, defendant’s new statement reflected the victim’s correct attire, that was “black stretch pants with stirrups on the bottoms and a multi-colored shirt.” Cf. People v. Nelson 235 Ill. 2d 386, 432 (2009) (noting that the defendant’s confession and videotaped statement disclosed facts of murder, home invasion, and aggravated arson that could not have been suggested to him because the autopsy had not yet been performed and the police had been unable to enter parts of the crime scene).
¶ 45 …The State failed to provide sufficient independent evidence to corroborate defendant’s confession, especially in light of the DNA evidence. The State failed to provide corroboration for defendant’s use of a dangerous weapon; defendant’s sexual penetration of the victim by the use of force; and the victim’s death during the attempt or commission of the aggravated criminal sexual assault. The only evidence of defendant’s commission of the offense came from the statements that the police prepared for defendant to sign. Because the State failed to establish the offense aliunde the confession, defendant’s conviction was unjustified and cannot stand.
¶ 46 After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State’s evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must reverse the conviction of Juan A. Rivera, Jr. See Smith, 185 Ill. 2d at 541 (citing Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 306).
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Scott Bartz is the author of The Tylenol Mafia: Marketing, Murder, and Johnson & Johnson. He held various sales, marketing, and management positions during his eleven years in the pharmaceutical industry (7 years at J&J). He has gained a unique perspective on jurisprudence in this country during four years of research into the 1982 and 1986 Tylenol murders cases and through his ongoing involvement as the relator in the qui tam lawsuit, “United States of America, ex rel. Scott Bartz, vs. Johnson & Johnson, et al.” (Case 1:11-cv-10316-RGS)
Johnson & Johnson has agreed to pay $158 million to settle a lawsuit and put an end to the trial that began last Monday in Austin, Texas. The settlement was announced this morning; one and-a-half weeks into a trial that has led to a great deal of negative press regarding the illegal marketing practices undertaken by J&J to promote its antipsychotic drug, Risperdal.
Johnson & Johnson and Texas were most certainly conducting ongoing negotiations while the trial was playing out in Austin. J&J’s offer of $158 million was good enough for Texas Attorney General Gregg Abbott to put an end to the proceedings. For Johnson & Johnson, this settlement also puts an end to the daily barrage of bad press coming out of Austin.
In 1999, Lawrence Marshall, a Professor of Law at Northwestern University, said, “We generally condone a great deal of misconduct when we think it serves the ultimate ends of justice. Many players in the system - judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors - know some of the stuff that happens, but nonetheless tend to turn a blind eye. There’s a feeling that that is how it works, that it’s legitimate to bend the truth sometimes when you are doing it with - quote, the greater good, end quote - in mind.”
